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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shane Thomas Pelletier appeals from the denial of his motion for credit for time 
served for probation violations while in Montana under the Interstate Compact on Adult 
Offender Supervision (hereinafter, Interstate Compact). On appeal, he asserts that the 
district court's factual findings concerning the credit were clearly erroneous in that they 
were not supported - and indeed were contradicted - by the evidence in the record. 
Alternatively, he asserts that, even if the district court's factual findings were not clearly 
erroneous, it erred when it denied his motion for credit for time served on several 
erroneous legal bases. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Pelletier pleaded guilty to felony possession of 
a controlled substance (cocaine) and misdemeanor possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana). (R., pp.48-51.) After Mr. Pelletier's probation was revoked for 
the final time, he filed a motion for credit for time served while he was held on various 
probation violations in Montana for this case. (R., pp.193, 199-201.) 
After his initial motion for credit for time served was denied (R., p.212), 
Mr. Pelletier filed a new motion for credit for time served in the amount of 380 days. 
That motion contained additional support for his claim that time he spent in Montana 
jails on probation violation holds and awaiting extradition to Idaho for this case was 
required to be credited against his executed sentence. (R., pp.228-32.) The motion 
included a recounting of various periods of time spent in custody in Montana that were 
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for probation violations in his Idaho case. (R., pp.229-30.) This motion included a 
section, entitled "OATH OF PETITONER," which provided, 
Comes now, Shane Pelletier, the Petitioner/Defendant herein, who avers 
and states as follows: 
I am the Petitioner/Defendant herein. I have read the [m]otion for credit 
for time served. I know the contents thereof and [b]elieve them to be true 
and correct to the best of my belief. 
(Signature] 
Shane Pelletier, Petitioner 
(R., p.232.) 
10/10/13 
Dated 
In support of the motion, he attached copies of documents from the Missoula 
County Detention Facility, including one entitled "Booking History Print Screen." 
(R., p.233.) That document shows that Mr. Pelletier was booked on February 1, 2010, 
and released on February 10, 2010, with the reason for release given as "RELEASE 
PER P/O" and the billing agency listed as "ADULT PROB & PAROLE." (R., p.233.) It 
further shows that he was booked on October 4, 2008, and released on November 18, 
2008, booked on February 24, 2008, and released on April 4, 2008, and booked on 
February 5, 2008, and released on February 8, 2008, with the release reason for all 
three periods of incarceration being "RELEASE PER P/O." (R., p.233.) The billing 
agency on the first entry is listed as "MISSOULA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPA," on the 
second as "MSLA ASSESSMENT/SANCTION CENT," and on the third, "ADULT PROB 
& PAROLE." (R., p.233.) 
Another document, entitled "Offense History," shows that he had been 
"[r]elease[d] per P/O" on February 8, 2008, and April 4, 2008, after being held on 
"Conditional Release Violation[s]." (R., p.234.) The April 4, 2008, entry also mentioned 
a "MASC Hold," from which he was also released per his probation officer. (R., p.234.) 
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A November 18, 2008, entry provides an offense description of "Probation Violation" 
and shows that he was "[r]elease(d] per P/O." (R., p.234.) A February 10, 2010, entry 
shows that he had been held on a parole violation and was "[r]elease[d] per P/O." 
(R., p.234.) 
In denying his motion, the district court began by noting, "There is nothing 
authenticating the printout" from the Missoula County Detention Facility before 
explaining, "[b]ut Pelletier's bigger problem is the attachment does not state the reason 
why Pelletier was in custody in Montana on those dates." (R., p.236.) Ultimately, the 
district court denied the motion, concluding, 
Because Pelletier has failed to provide any proof to support his "Motion for 
Credit for Time Served Incarcerated" filed by Pelletier on October 21, 
2013, (and indeed most of the credit for time served Pelletier now seeks 
was physically impossible to have been served under this Idaho case as 
during those times sought there was no outstanding bench warrant), 
Pelletier's motion must be denied. 
(R., p.241.) 
Mr. Pelletier filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's order denying 
his second request for credit for time served. (R., p.250.) 
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1. 
ISSUES 
Did the district court make clearly erroneous factual find 
credit for time served requested by Mr. Pelletier? 
concerning the 
2. Alternatively, even assuming the district court's factual findings were not clearly 
erroneous, did the district court deny the motion on erroneous legal bases? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Made Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings Concerning The Credit For 
Time Served Requested By Mr. Pelletier 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Pelletier filed a motion for credit for time served that was supported by a 
sworn statement setting forth periods during which he was held in custody in Montana 
for violations of his Interstate Compact probation. He supported some of the time 
requested with documents from the Missoula County Detention Facility. The district 
court, concluding that Mr. Pelletier had presented no evidence in support of his motion 
denied the motion. Mr. Pelletier asserts that the district court's factual findings were 
clearly erroneous as they were not supported by any evidence. 
8. Standard Of Review 
When considering the district court's findings of fact regarding credit for time 
served, the appellate court will defer "unless those findings are unsupported by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous." 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006) ( citation omitted). 
C. The District Court Made Clearly Erroneous Factual Findings Concerning The 
Credit For Time Served Requested By Mr. Pelletier 
While Idaho Code § 19-2603 expressly provides that a defendant who has been 
arrested on a bench warrant for a probation violation is entitled to credit for time served 
prior to the adjudication of the allegations, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a 
person arrested on the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant is also entitled to such 
credit. Covert, 143 Idaho at 171. In Covert, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
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time spent in custody on an "agent's warrant"1 for an alleged probation violation prior to 
the issuance, and service, of a bench warrant for the alleged violation was required to 
be credited pursuant to I.C. § 19-2603. Id. at 170-71. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court of Appeals reasoned that, "where the arresting [probation) officer delivers a 
probationer to the county jail with an agent's warrant, that warrant is sufficient for the 
detention of the probationer." Id. at 170 (citing I.C. § 20-227). 
In describing when an issue as to when the determination of the facts of a case is 
factual or legal, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "Generally, unless the facts 
presented are undisputed, whether there was a breach of the terms of a contract is a 
question of fact." Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79 (2008) (citations omitted). In 
a number of cases concerning whether findings of fact were clearly erroneous, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has cited to at least some evidence in the record upon which the 
district court explicitly or implicitly relied. See Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 352 (2009) 
("In reaching its decision ... the district court relied primarily upon the provisions of the 
three deeds"); see also Pinnacle Engineers, Inc. v. Heron Brook, LLC, 139 Idaho 756, 
759 (2004) ('There was conflicting expert testimony regarding whether Pinnacle violated 
the standard of care in this instance ... Heron Brook asks us to reweigh the evidence 
on appeal and find that Heron Brook's expert was more credible ... Heron Brook has 
not convinced us to abandon that well-established principle of appellate review."). 
1 An "agent's warrant" is a written statement "setting forth that the parolee, probationer, 
or person under drug court or mental health court supervision has, in the judgment of 
said parole or probation officer, violated the conditions of drug court or mental health 
court or conditions of his parole or probation" that authorizes "any other officer with 
power of arrest" to arrest a probationer or parolee. I.C. § 20-227(1 ). A person's actual 
parole or probation officer "may arrest" a person under his or her supervision "without a 
warrant." Id. The two methods of arresting a probationer or parolee appear to lead to 
an identical result: incarceration of the supervised person until a determination is made 
on the allegations. 
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More importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has long "held that the trial court 
must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness, unless 
his testimony is inherently improbable or impeached." Russ v. Brown, 96 Idaho 369, 
373 (1974) (citations omitted); see also Olsen v. Hawkins, 90 Idaho 28, 37 (1965) ("This 
court has consistently held that such [uncontradicted] testimony cannot be arbitrarily 
disregarded."); Roemer v. Green Pastures Farms, Inc., 97 Idaho 591, 593 (1976) 
(upholding district court's rejection of appraiser's testimony based upon its finding that, 
in light of details elicited on cross-examination, it was "'inherently unreliable"') (citing 
Russ). 
In this case, the district court did not hold that Mr. Pelletier's sworn statement,2 
concerning his custody status during the periods for which he sought credit, was 
inherently improbable nor were his uncontradicted statements of fact impeached. The 
fact that Mr. Pelletier had an interest in the outcome of the motion for which he provided 
evidence does not render his evidence inherently improbable or unreliable. See 
Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, _, 74 P.2d 171, 175 (1937) ("The rule 
applicable to all witnesses, whether parties or interested in the event of an action, is, 
that either a board, court, or jury must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted 
testimony of a credible witness, unless his testimony is inherently improbable, or 
rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial.") (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
2 Mr. Pelletier asserts that his motion, which included a section entitled "OATH OF 
PETITIONER," containing a statement in which he averred that the contents of the 
motion were "true and correct to the best of my belief" (R., p.232), satisfied the 
provisions of Idaho Criminal Rule 2.1 and I.C. § 9-1406, which became effective on July 
1, 2013, three months before Mr. Pelletier filed his motion (R., p.228), rendering the 
recitation of facts contained in his motion a sworn statement and, thus, evidence. I.C.R. 
2.1; I.C. § 9-1406. 
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In State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 2013), the defendant sought credit 
for time served while he was incarcerated in Florida, serving a prison sentence for new 
crimes, which violated the conditions of his probation, committed while there under the 
Interstate Compact. Kesling, 155 Idaho at 675. Although it bears some superficial 
resemblance to the facts of Mr. Pelletier's case, it differs significantly in that it does not 
appear that Kesling provided any evidence - whether in the form of testimony or 
affidavits - establishing that he was held on either a bench warrant or its functional 
equivalent while serving his sentence in Florida. Id. at 678. Furthermore, documents 
that were in evidence concerning the defendant's sentence constituted "substantial 
evidence" supporting the district court's finding as to when the defendant began being 
held on the Idaho warrant or its functional equivalent. Id. 
Unlike the situation in Kesling, Mr. Pelletier provided a sworn statement 
demonstrating that he was in custody in Montana for violating the terms of his Idaho 
probation. Also unlike in Kesling, no evidence in the record contradicted Mr. Pelletier's 
sworn statement concerning his custody status, including its duration and that he was 
being held for violating the terms of his Idaho probation. In light of the well-established 
principle that uncontradicted evidence that is not inherently improbable or impeached 
must be accepted by the finder of fact and may not be arbitrarily disregarded, and the 
uncontradicted evidence presented in support of his motion, Mr. Pelletier asserts that 
the district court erred when it denied his motion for credit for time served in the amount 
of 353 days.3 Alternatively, and to the extent that this Court finds that Mr. Pelletier's 
3 This calculation differs from Mr. Pelletier's request for 380 days. Analyzing the periods 
of incarceration set forth in Mr. Pelletier's motion - and excluding his reference to time 
spent during his first rider for which he received credit - results in a total of 353 days 
spent in custody for violations of his Idaho probation. To the extent that Mr. Pelletier 
claims credit for time between his arrest on March 28, 2009, for misdemeanor DUI for 
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sworn statement must supported by additional evidence, he maintains that, with 
105 days of his custody, the documents from the Missoula County Detention 
Center support his sworn statement, entitling him to at least 105 days of credit. 
(R., pp.233-35.)4 
II. 
Assuming The District Court's Factual Findings Were Not Clearly Erroneous, The 
District Court Denied The Motion On Erroneous Legal Bases 
Assuming that this Court concludes that the district court's factual findings were 
not clearly erroneous, this Court should vacate the order denying Mr. Pelletier's request 
for credit for time served and remand for reconsideration because the district court 
based its decision on three legally erroneous grounds. A determination as to whether 
the district court "has properly awarded credit for time served to the facts of a particular 
case is a question of law" and subject to free review on appeal. State v. Vasquez, 142 
Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted). 
First, the district court explained that it was "physically impossible" for 
Mr. Pelletier to receive credit for time served in Montana for probation violations 
because "during those times sought there was no outstanding bench warrant" for 
violating his Idaho probation. (R., p.262.) As was discussed supra, Idaho case law is 
clear that service of a bench warrant is not required to obtain credit for time served for a 
which he was later "extradited to the Kootenai County jail, where he was eventually 
given a 'rider', which was completed on January 6th, 2010," he has provided no 
evidence that he was held between March 28, 2009, and his extradition on a bench 
warrant or its functional equivalent prior to being sent on his first rider. (R., p.229.) As 
such, he has not provided any evidence to support that period of time, and he does not 
challenge the denial of credit for that small portion of time on appeal. 
4 The basis for Mr. Pelletier's assertion that the documents attached to his motion 
support his claim as to 105 days of custody is explained in detail in the Statement of 
Facts, supra. 
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probation violation; the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant is sufficient to satisfy 
Idaho Code § 19-2603. See Covert, 143 Idaho at ·171. 
Second, the district court erroneously rejected Mr. Pelletier's sworn statement, in 
the form of his motion for credit for time served, when it concluded that he "has failed to 
provide any proof to support" his motion. See I.R.C.P. 7(d) and I.C. § 9-1406. 
Third, the district court erred when it concluded that the documents from the 
Missoula County Detention Facility, attached to Mr. Pelletier's motion, could not be 
considered because "[t]here is nothing authenticating the printout." (R., p.256.) The 
problem with the district court's reasoning is that the Rules of Evidence, including Rule 
901 's authentication requirement, do not apply to sentencing proceedings and other 
miscellaneous matters. See 1.R.E. 101 (e)(3) (providing that the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, "other than those with respect to privileges, do not apply [to] . . . 
[p]roceedings for ... sentencing"). 
Because the district court denied Mr. Pelletier's motion for credit for time served 
on an erroneous legal basis, this Court should vacate the order denying credit for time 
served, and remand this matter to the district court for reconsideration under the 
appropriate legal standards. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Pelletier respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the order denying his motion for credit for time served, and remand this matter to 
the district court for entry of an order granting an additional 353 days of credit (or, 
alternatively, 105 days of credit). Alternatively, Mr. Pelletier asks this Court to vacate 
the order denying his motion for credit for time served, and remand this matter for a new 
hearing at which the proper legal standards are applied. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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